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Abstract 
Research works on the causes of business failure as well as tools on the predictability of 
business failure has received considerable attention in finance literature due to the 2007 
recession. In 2009, the UK insolvency rate hit a record high of 270,000 i.e. 11.9% death rate. 
The Office of National Statistics (ONS) reports that, this is the first time business deaths have 
outnumbered business births since the year 2000. Across industries, the construction industry 
in 2009 recorded the highest number of business deaths in a single year with over 44,000 
company bankruptcies. The aim of this research is to develop a model that gives construction 
companies in distress a likelihood of success at recovery. Based on a literature review, 52 
factors were found to be the causes of business failure in the construction industry. However, 
the Input and Output model suggests that, while some factors are determinants, others are 
indicators or symptoms of business failure. It was found that the top seven determinants of 
business failure in the construction industry are; "Management Incompetence", "Insufficient 
Capital", "Lack of Business Knowledge", "Fraud", "Industry Weakness", "Poor Technical 
and Technological Capacity", and "Poor Relations with Clients and Government", while, 
"Inadequate Profit" and "Inadequate Sales" are the top two indicators of business failure in 
construction companies. A transition by implication involves change. It was found that 
economic down-turn does not necessarily cause business failure but combined with company 
flaws and bad practice, produces a rough tide for companies to ride on. Most do not survive.  
Leadership was also found to be, arguably, the most valuable resource at the stage of 
company turn-around. Therefore, the conceptual framework was designed with the view that 
leadership drive the transition process. It is hoped that this model will aid managers of 
companies in distress narrow their focus on the likely determinants of their company 
problems. To easily and quickly identify the problem, return to the board, address the 
problem and turn-around performance towards success. 
Key words: business failure, turn-around, recovery 
 
Introduction 
Hitherto, researchers, organisations, entrepreneurs, investors and policy makers have been 
interested in the reasons why businesses fail (Kale and Arditi, 1998; Dikmen et al, 2010). In 
the summer of 2007, the UK financial market suffered a meltdown that drove so many 
construction companies out of business; both large companies and Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs) (HC, 2009). The current insolvency statistics demonstrate the difficulties 
being experienced by many businesses. It’s been reported that building firms fold every four 
hours as bankruptcies soar. A statistics of 500 building firms exactly was stated insolvent 
3 
 
during the first quarter of 2008; the highest in five years (Langdon, 2008). In 2009, the UK 
insolvency rate hit a record high of 270,000 with construction responsible for about 40,000 
i.e. 14.9% death rate. The Office of National Statistics (ONS) reports that, this is the first 
time business deaths have outnumbered business births since the year 2000.  
Business failure has been defined as a fall in revenue or a rise in expense to such a point that 
the company cannot secure further debt or equity for business. The consequence of this will 
either be a discontinuance of ownership and management (through mergers) or a 
discontinuance of business (complete scrap of the product or service) (Shepherd, 2003; 
Everett and Watson, 1998). A similar definition is that by Dimitras (1996; cited in Dikmen et 
al, 2010) who defined Business failure as “a situation that a firm cannot pay their lenders, 
stock shareholders, and suppliers”. The latter definition has been adopted for this research in 
the context of the construction industry. It is important to note that reported business failures 
do not include disclosures of business discontinuances without loss to creditors. Financial 
distress is a significant indicator of business failure and should be diagnosed at an early stage 
to avoid bankruptcy. 
Current Events 
In recent times, some major construction companies have gone under. For example, 
Connaught plc, a social-housing giant operating the UK and specialising in repair and 
maintenance services collapsed in September 2010. The company employs about 10,000 staff 
(Knight, 2010). The cause of the giant’s collapse is unclear. Some argue that there were 
irregularities with Connaught's accounting books. Others argue that pressures from the 
government cuts were to blame. Whatever the opinions of people concerning the collapse of 
Connaught, the following facts remain about the company’s business activities. Firstly, 
“suicide bidding”, Connaught plc was found to be bidding too low for projects in order to 
win contracts with local authorities and housing associations. This inevitably had an effect on 
the stability of the company. Stone (1999) knows too well about mark-ups, profit, and 
survival in the construction industry. Pricing too low automatically jeopardises survival. 
Secondly, poor financial management; Connaught plc gave false impressions of its financial 
health by tweaking its financial statements to hide losses and accentuate growth. Once, they 
were found out, their funders lost confidence in the company and refused to refinance 
Connaught’s debt of £220 million. The company also had a shortage in working capital. 
Thirdly, receivable difficulties; owing to the government cuts it was difficult for Connaught 
plc to get its payment from its public sector clients – local councils delayed payment for as 
long as contractually possible (The Guardian, 2010). Fourthly, sudden management 
departures; this is arguably a clear case of the "Captain abandoning ship" sort of move. 
According to a Guardian analyst, within two years, three top executives; the CEO, the 
executive chairman and founder, and the financial director all quit office and cashed-in shares 
and options worth a combined £16.6 million. These factors contributed to the demise of 
Connaught plc. 
Another recent case is ROK, a national house builder and Connaught’s biggest competition. 
ROK enjoyed a season of growth since its establishment in 2000. Its value was up to E430m. 
The company, led by its chief executive officer, was vicious and relentless in its growth; 
capturing everything it sets its eyes on. However, according to Building Design (2012) the 
company’s business strategy was not consistent with its own unique style. What caused this 
great giant to fall? First, diversification from contracting to maintenance, hence taking on 
more debt, and which meant cash was not received up front as much. Second, ROK made 
some unforced acquisitions, which also increased debt. Third, the company had no financial 
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cushion as it was heavily leveraged. Fourth, there was also a case of accounting irregularities 
in the company’s plumbing division. Lastly, poor leadership, ROK had a CEO who was 
more concerned about the company image and confidence than the work itself. He was 
obsessed with establishing the company’s corporate identity, vision and unity of purpose. The 
company’s 3,800 employees were constantly mesmerised by loud and flashy internal 
conferences, with high performing staff often rewarded with the “ROK star” and it’s top 
management incentivised with handsome bonuses for meeting targets. Its share prices were 
proudly displayed in its regional offices. As the company started to decline to an impending 
death, there was obviously, no right leadership present to turn-around the giant. For a 
company to have any chance at recovery, the leadership has to be good, humble, and possess 
a strong will (Collins, 2001). Fletcher and Wearden (2010) also affirm this by stating that 
“the onus on recovery is management-driven, and outweighs any macro concerns about the 
construction industry”. From literature, it was found that economic down-turn does not 
necessarily cause business failure. It only exposes company flaws and inflames the impact of 
bad company practices. The combination produces a rough tide for the company and only a 
few survive. 
Problem statement 
In construction, failure studies have focused on explaining failure at the project level rather 
than the corporate level (Arditi et al, 2000). However, it is important to note that failure at 
corporate level can not be divorced from failure at project level but not necessary the other 
way around. Construction, like any other business, needs funds to run. Firms need to act fast 
when company finance begins to shrink. Jonathan (2002)and Langdon (2012) reported that 
cash flow shortages, falling profits, failure to pay suppliers, delayed and /or reduced valuation 
certificates, progress of works slowing, insufficient resources deployed on the project, falling 
asset values, excessive borrowing, or even boardroom tensions are obvious signs of company 
financial difficulty but are often overlooked by management. When a company admits its 
situation and pulls the alarm of distress, then, the first thing to do is to try to stage a 
turnaround. If that’s not possible, then the next step will be to try and salvage the project 
either by extracting a meagre return or limit and manage the loss and damage associated with 
it. During a turnaround, management could decide to adopt a number of strategies. These 
include; negotiating with existing lenders, raising new equity, disposal of assets, introducing 
new management, and informal agreement with creditors. If none or a combination of these 
strategies proves effective, management must begin to consider a formal insolvency 
procedure. However, no contractor wants to get to the point of insolvency. It is always hoped 
that the recovery is successful. Here, already things are going wrong, the company’s financial 
stream has dried up or about to. It is important to come up with strategic decisions for 
sourcing new funds and having the right people in place to take the company to greatness. 
Restructuring of the whole company becomes imperative; management structure, asset 
structure, capital structure, determining an appropriate mix of debt and equity that fits the 
company’s business strategy is vital to the turnaround process. Dept repayment strategies 
must be in place. With little or no cash to repay creditors in full, it is important to prioritise 
creditors to be paid. These are lenders who are likely to take legal action against the company 
or have sufficient power to cripple progress. However, this will result in survival “credit 
management” with cash being juggled to avoid any likelihood of legal action from those of 
less priority on the list.  
Literature is pervaded with failure of construction businesses and not much talking about 
their turn-around (success stories), the processes taken to have a great chance at successful 
turn-around (critical success factors), or the factors that could impede  efforts at the transition 
5 
 
period. There is very limited data on this area. Some may argue that having a continuity plan 
is enough, but time and time again, this has been insufficient to rescue a company in distress. 
There needs to be a more reliable framework to secure company survival. The main aim of 
this research is to design a framework for corporate recovery in construction companies. The 
research will identify companies that approached their impending demise but had a strategic 
rebirth and a sustained success. These companies will be compared to other carefully selected 
comparable companies that failed to make the transition, and/or sustain it. The aim is to 
discover the essential factors at work during the transition period (for example Fig 1); the 
common problems encountered and the decisions taken to address these problems.  
It is hoped that in the end, the framework will provide companies with a better chance of 
survival when faced with failure. This research will provide a full review of current literature 
on factors surrounding the failure of construction companies both at corporate and project 
level. This was done in order to have a clearer understanding of the determinants of business 
failure.  
 
 
Fig 1: Good-to-great transition. Source; Collins (2001) 
 
The mission is not to bring out a recovery formulae but to outline a number of activities, 
steps, strategies and tactics that if when applied, the company will have the best chance at 
survival. Within this research, the term business failure is only used for comprehensive 
reasons only. It is not looking at business failure or failed business (bankruptcy). When we 
say “businesses that have approached business failure” we mean businesses in decline, 
businesses that are at pre-insolvency stage; the fence of bankruptcy and profitable. That is, 
businesses that are barely breaking even, providing neither a reasonable income for the 
owner, nor a fair return to the investor. They are also known as “failing businesses” (Land, 
1975; Everett and Watson, 1998) 
Determinants of Business failure 
Based on an extensive review of literature, a list of 52 factors was compiled as an exhaustive 
list of factors that are responsible for business failure in construction companies. Most were 
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iterations of Dun and Bradstreet’s credit reporting database of 1989 - 1993. In this paper, the 
factors were outlined under the same categories as in Arditi et al (2000). They categories are; 
budgetary issues which covers financial management aspects of the company; human and 
organisational capital issues which covers some aspects of company tangible and intangible 
resources; issues of adaptation to market conditions which covers sales, competitiveness, 
diversification and expansion; and business and macroeconomic issues which covers industry 
specific and national economy issues. This can be seen in Table 1. A new category was added 
to accommodate social reasons for business failure. It was found that race and/or minority 
status of company owners can impede the growth and hence survival of the construction 
company (Bates, 1997).  
After the factors were outlined and ranked, the input/output model designed by Koksal and 
Arditi (2004) was used to show cause-and-effect relationship. From the systems theorist’s 
point of view, organisations are continuously transforming inputs into outputs. This model 
shows that organisational factors as well as external factors are the main determinants of 
business failure in construction which then reflects on company performance also known as 
symptoms or indicators. This argument is supported by the work of Dikmen et al, (2010) as 
they identified 33 determinants mostly associated with failure likelihood to fall under “value 
chain”, “resources”, “decisions” and “chance factors” which are same as organisational and 
external factors. The effect of these determinants on the company performance will then be 
the symptoms. These symptoms can either show growth (survival) stagnation or failure 
(outcomes). For example, Lack of business knowledge and inadequate managerial experience 
may increase operational expenses, create conflict within the organization, create a poor 
company image to clients which will hurt the competitiveness of the company and hence 
result in inadequate sale of goods and services, which may in turn affect an organization’s 
profits. Having the symptoms does not automatically mean business failure. Not when the 
company yields returns greater than the minimum acceptable hurdle rate. By implication it 
can still pay lenders and stakeholders but has not learnt to cut cost. As a matter of fact, the 
input and output model points out clearly to managers the areas that need improving. Koksal 
and Arditi (2010) called it the feedback loop. Staging a turn-around to improve company 
performance could save the company.  
Dikmen et al, (2010) saw “poor company image” as an intangible resource and as a 
determinant.. However this research argues that poor company image is a performance 
indicator, a symptom of failure. Before it becomes a company resource it is a performance 
indicator. A “poor company image” could be a result of insufficient capital to promote itself 
or because of its poor technical and technological capacity hence cannot maintain a certain 
required standard of work in the market it operates. Or, it could be as a result of poor 
relations with clients, supervisors and government or managerial incompetence. It is a result 
of any of or a combination of the above reasons. Therefore, it’s been placed under symptoms 
or performance indicators. By discretion, other factors mentioned by other researchers which 
were not mentioned by Arditi et al (2000), were placed under the categories they belong. 
Table 2 shows determinants of business failure in construction companies on the left vertical 
corner and a list of researchers on the top horizontal corner. The factors were ranked based on 
which factor the individual researchers considered to be most important. Some factors were 
not mentioned by other researchers hence, they were not ranked by them. The factors were 
then grouped and represented using the input and output model with human, organisational 
and financial capital, macroeconomic, social and natural factors as inputs. And, budgetary, 
business and market adaptability issues as outputs.  
  
Table 1: Ranking of determinants of business failure by Researchers 
 Dikmen 
et al 
(2010) 
Arditi 
et al 
(2000) 
Everett 
and 
Watson 
(1998) 
Kale 
and 
Arditi 
(1998) 
Hall and 
Young 
(1991) 
Stead and 
Smallman 
(1999) 
Koksal 
and 
Arditi 
(2004) 
Chan et 
al 
(2005) 
 Byabashaija 
(2007) 
Harada, 
and 
Kageyama 
(2011) 
Perry 
(2001) 
FACTORS            
Budgetary issues 
1. Insufficient profit  1 4   2 1   2  
2. Heavy operating expenses  3   9  2     
3. Insufficient capital 15 4 1 2 1  1     
4. Burdensome institutional debt  5     3     
5. Receivable difficulties from the client 6 10     6     
            
Human: organizational capital issues 
6. Lack of business knowledge  6 2 1 2 2 2 1  1 2 
7. Lack of organisational knowledge 2    3  4   3 3 
8. Poor relations with 
clients/government/networking 
5   6 
5 
 2  3   
9. Lack of managerial experience/competence 1 11 1 1 2 1 4 1 1  1 
10. Poor technical and technological capacity 3  7  10       
11. Saving non-value adding activities 9           
12. Poor company image 10   5        
13. Scarcity of financial resources 15   4        
14. Overexpansion/not expanding 26 18  3   9     
15. Wrong level of diversification 20           
16. Fraud  12 3  4  3 2 1   
17. Lack of line experience  13     6     
18. Lack of commitment  14     8     
19. Poor project cost estimation 25    4    6   
20. Poor financial management 12    3       
21. Wrong project selection 21           
22. Poor working habit  15     7     
23. Unexpected change within the workforce 17           
24. Poor value chain analysis at the corporate level 7        2   
25. Poor strategic planning 8          4 
26. Poor human resource management 16        2   
27. Poor leadership 14           
  
28. Poor investment decisions 13   6        
29. Poor communication 18        4   
30. Poor planning and scheduling 19           
31. Poor monitoring and control 22           
32. Poor environmental scanning 11           
33. Poor organisation of resources 28           
34. Poor quality management and control 30           
35. Poor selection and management of supply chain 31           
36. Poor project risk management 32           
37. Poor change order and claim management 33           
38. Unsuccessful restructuring/reorganisation 4        5   
            
Issues of adaptation to market conditions 
39. Inadequate sales 27 9 5  6  4     
40. Not competitive  16     7     
            
Business issues 
41. Business conflicts  8   6  5     
42. Family problems    5 6  5     
            
Macroeconomic issues 
43. Industry weakness  2 6  7  1     
44. Poor growth prospects  17     3     
45. High interest rate  19 3  8  4     
46. Economic fluctuations 24           
47. Shrinkage in construction demand 27 9 5  6  4     
            
Natural factors 
48. Disasters  7     2     
49. Change in politics 29           
50. Sudden death of the company leader 23           
            
Social factors            
51. Race            
52. Societal class (majority or minority)            
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In the input and output model, organisational and environmental factors are 
represented as determinants of business failure. These determinants are further 
classified under “Human, Organisational and Financial Capital” and 
“Macroeconomic, Social and Natural Factors”. 
 
 
Figure 1: Input and Output framework of business failure/survival in the construction industry 
Human, Organisational and Financial Capital 
These are factors unique to the organisation. They have to do with company resources 
(tangible and intangible), and how they are managed i.e. every decision made to 
allocate these resources both at corporate and project level. Company intangible 
resources are company assets that are saleable though not material or physical such as 
relationship capital and skill (Lu, 2009; Lu and Sexton, 2006).  
Table 2: Determinants of business failure in order of importance  
DETERMINANTS 
ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
Human, Organisational And Financial 
Capital 
Macroeconomic, social and natural factors 
1. Management incompetence/experience 
2. Insufficient capital/Scarcity of financial 
resources 
3. Lack of business knowledge  
4. Fraud 
5. Lack of organisational knowledge 
6. Poor relations with clients/government 
7. Poor technical and technological capacity 
8. Poor investment decisions  
1. Industry weakness 
i. Poor growth prospects 
ii. Shrinkage in construction demand 
2. Disasters 
3. High interest rate 
4. Economic fluctuations  
5. Sudden death of the company leader 
6. Change in politics 
7. Race 
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9. Overexpansion/not expanding 
10. Wrong level of diversification 
11. Family problems  
12. Poor project cost estimation 
13. Poor financial management 
14. Lack of line experience 
15. Lack of commitment 
16. Poor working habit 
17. Unexpected change within the workforce 
18. Poor value chain analysis at the corporate 
level 
19. Poor strategic planning 
20. Poor human resource management 
21. Poor leadership 
22. Poor communication 
23. Poor planning and scheduling 
24. Poor monitoring and control 
25. Poor organisation of resources 
26. Poor quality management and control 
27. Poor selection and management of supply 
chain 
28. Poor project risk management 
29. Poor change order and claim management 
30. Poor environmental scanning 
31. Saving non-value adding activities 
32. Unsuccessful restructuring/reorganisation 
8. Social class  
 
 
Most researchers ranked “Managerial Incompetence / Experience” as most important 
determinant of failure in construction companies (Dikmen et al, 2010; Arditi et al, 
2000; Stead and Smallman, 1999; Chan et al, 2005; Byabashaija, 2007; Harada, and 
Kageyama, 2011; Perry, 2001; Everett and Watson, 1998). Followed by; Insufficient 
capital/Scarcity of financial resources, Lack of business knowledge, Fraud, Lack of 
organisational knowledge, Poor relations with clients/government, Poor technical and 
technological capacity, Poor investment decisions, Overexpansion/not expanding, 
Wrong level of diversification, and so on (see Table 2). On the other hand, a few 
researchers assert that “Insufficient Capital” is the most important determinant in 
construction business failure (Hall and Young, 1991; Wong and Ng, 2010; Kale and 
Arditi, 1998) This is supported by the Input and Output model designed by Koksal 
and Arditi (2004) which showed “Insufficient Capital” as the most important 
determinant in construction business failure with a high rate of occurrence. The 
argument is that, firstly, construction is a capital intensive business. Secondly, where 
contractors are paid on interim basis, the often negative reading on company’s project 
cash flow report during construction (Arditi et al., 2000) makes a lot of companies to 
run on debt until practical completion before they can fully recover their investments 
and count profit. Hall and Young, (1991) state that the larger the amount of debt, the 
greater the probability of failure. Warren Buffet states more succinctly “you can’t go 
bankrupt if you don’t owe money”. Thirdly, it is argued that small firms have 
difficulties in raising funds and there is often poor management of debt. Small firms 
do not pay much attention to financial ratios as big firms hence their increased 
likelihood of failure (Kale and Arditi, 1998).  
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Previous studies have also reported that the amount of capital invested at start-up is 
positively related to the success of a business. Improving the financial performance of 
construction industry is crucial for all stakeholders within the construction industry 
(Bates, 1990; Bruderl et al., 1992; and Holtz-Eakin, 1994; cited from Everett and 
Watson, 1998). It will be interesting to note that Dikmen et al., (2010) found “Scarcity 
of financial resources” i.e. insufficient capital, as the 15th most important determinant 
while Arditi et al., (2000) ranked it as the 9
th
 most important 
Macroeconomic, social and natural factors 
Macroeconomic trends affect the construction industry. Whenever there is a recession 
the construction industry is the first to feel the effect because of shrinkage in 
construction demand, and the last to recover (Langdon, 2008; ONS, 2011). “Poor 
growth prospects could be as a result of over competition where there are too many 
contractors fighting over few contracts. This could lead to “suicide bidding” i.e. 
contractors submitting underpriced tenders in order to secure contracts or bidding for 
contracts beyond company specialty and capacity. As the name implies, this could 
lead to failure. Issues like ‘Disaster and “sudden death of company leader” are purely 
chance factors and may not lead to company failure in the event that they occur. 
However, in the case of small and medium firms, the death of a company leader could 
be the end of that business (Wallace, 2010). With respect to social issues, “race” and 
“social class” does play a subtle role in business failure. Bates (1997) analysed 
financial institution’s lending to small business start-ups. He found that relative to the 
white-owned firms, black and minority owned business start-ups with identical 
measured characteristics are observed to be poorly capitalised and therefore are more 
likely to have discontinued operations over time.  
Table 3: Symptoms/Indicators of business failure in order of importance  
SYMPTOMS  
PERFORMANCE  
Budgetary issues Business and market adaptability issues 
1. Insufficient profit 
2. Heavy operating expenses 
3. Receivable difficulties from the client 
4. Burdensome institutional debt 
1. Inadequate sales  
2. Poor company image 
3. Business conflicts 
4. Not competitive 
 
Budgetary issues 
The most important symptom under budgetary issues is “Insufficient Profit”. It can be 
the effect of any or a combination of the determinants in Table 2. For example, poor 
investment decisions or wrong project selection could lead to heavy operating 
expenses which could lead to increased borrowing (debt) and in turn lead to operating 
at a loss (insufficient profit). Bad projects could also lead to payment problems and 
this will definitely affect growth and profit of the company.  
Business and market adaptability issues 
Determinants such as; management incompetence, and/or economic fluctuations 
could lead to inadequate sale, this in turn will reflect on company profit. A continuous 
and worsening string of inadequate sales could cause the construction company to 
bow out of the market - failure. Another example is when managers lack the business 
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knowledge to attract clients, suppliers and distributors and poor relations with clients, 
government and supervisors could lead to “poor company image” and cause the 
company any competitive advantage with regards to its image. Carnall (2003) and  
Existing Turnaround Frameworks 
The key to this research will be a systematic contrasting of the successful turn-around 
companies to their direct comparisons. The main question this research will keep 
asking as it goes on this journey will be; “what’s different?” A review of literature 
produced a couple of turn-around frameworks. Jim Collins, the author of “Good-to-
Great” and co –author of “Built to last” supported by a  team undertook a five year 
project to find how to turn a good organisation into one that produces sustained great 
results. He defined “Good” as “the enemy of great”. Barely a definition but it is a 
philosophical way of looking at it. Inferring from his book, good could be a point 
where a company is doing well enough to be complacent and probably oblivious of its 
loss of market share to its competition. While “great”, he defined, as “attaining a 
sustained cumulative stock return of about 7 times the general market over a long 
period of time; in this case 15years. The general market cumulative stock return, 
however significant, is the equivalent of “good”. By the end of the research, he and 
his team came up with the ultimate “flywheel” (Figure 3). This is a framework of 
concepts broken into three broad stages: disciplined people, disciplined thought, and 
disciplined action; within each concept, are two key concepts. From a critical view, it 
seems that accountability is the core of these principles. Jim Collins and his team 
found that these three concepts help make the transition successful. A similar concept 
is that pioneered by Vital Factors Solutions in the United States who believes in four 
principles; a commitment to accountability, communication, effective decision-
making and problem-solving. With accountability and culture of transparency in 
communication it was easy to identify problems and address them.   
 
 
Figure 2: Good-to-great ultimate flywheel 
(Collins, 2001) 
  
The major differences between the good-to-great research and this research are; the 
companies here a facing failure. Therefore, they are not comfortable. There is 
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urgency. Also, the level of pressure at the time of transition and the conscious effort 
to make a change is different. This means that there is a plan and a program with 
transformation targets. In Collin’s research, one of their major findings was the good-
to-great companies had no tag line, launch events, or program to signify their 
transformation process. In order words, they did not consciously adopt a revolutionary 
process of moving from good-to-great. The construction industry is not a very stable 
industry. It is very volatile. However, a company does not have to be in a good 
industry to do well with a lasting legacy (Collins, 2001). Jim Collins used his top 10 
good-to-great companies to make this statement more explicit. 
 
Another turn-around framework, but this time, for construction, is one used by the 
Construction business recovery team at Davis Langdon. However, this is project 
focused. They use this flowchart as a guide during CBR process. This is quite useful 
to this research as project distress can transcend to corporate distress and vice versa. 
 
 
Figure 3: Distress Project Assessment 
(Langdon, 2008) 
 
The above frameworks are useful but there are limitations as it does not cover the 
whole process of transition. However, they will used as strong framework references 
in this research.  
 14 
 
Aims and objectives of the research 
 
Aim 
The aim of the research is to develop a framework that gives construction companies 
in distress a likelihood of success at recovery. 
 
Objective 
1. Explore the determinants of business failure 
2. Explore existing turn-around frameworks in the construction industry 
3. To identify critical success factors in construction business recovery  
4. Identify factors that could impede successful transition. 
5. Design a framework for successful recovery in construction business rescue. 
Research question 
As already mentioned, the main focus will be the “Transition Point”. The main 
questions will be: can a failing construction company turn-around its fortune to 
success, if so, how? Also, how can it sustain success? In simple terms, the research 
will be asking the question; what happened here? Therefore, the research will look at 
successful turn-around as well as comparison companies who failed to make the turn; 
despite all efforts. What is profound and glairing is that the industry needs to change 
they way it does business. And this can not be overstated. 
Research methodology  
The first part of this research conducted an extensive review of literature that 
produced an exhaustive list of 52 factors that are responsible for business failure in 
construction companies. Most were iterations of Dun and Bradstreet’s credit reporting 
database of 1989 - 1993. In this paper, the factors were outlined under the same 
categories as in Arditi et al (2000). The second part of the research will be looking at 
businesses in decline. Therefore, the research will adopt the multiple case study 
approach. The lessons to be learnt from the multiple case studies are intended to 
expand and generalize theories (qualitative) for use construction companies. 
According to Tracey et al (1995) it is appropriate to begin theory building with case 
study research. Data will be collected from both primary and secondary sources; 
professional and academic journals, conference papers, government publications and 
textbooks, company documents and online news papers. The literature review will 
inform the formulation of the questions for the interview and will invariably answer 
objective 1 and 2. The intention of this research is to collect factual information as 
well as opinions of contractors, developers, funders (banks) and other stakeholders 
deal apparent failure and how they drive out of it. Therefore, it was felt that the most 
appropriate method of data collection technique will be ‘interview’. Face-face 
interviews will be held with both senior managers of the contractor, developers, 
financiers and their respective suppliers who held key positions of responsibility 
during the transition era. This will allow a better understanding of the local context 
(case study) and the collection of more precise accurate and reliable data. For 
triangulation purposes, the use of focus groups will be utilised where possible. Focus 
groups will be held to confirm first hand from the executives, what they shared in 
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common. This will be held, separately, for both companies that recovered, and those 
that didn’t. NVIVO will be used for analysis. 
Conceptual framework 
There is a general consensus among researchers that the major and number one 
determinant of business failure in the construction industry is “Management 
Incompetence” (Dikmen et al, 2010; Arditi et al, 2000; Everett and Watson, 1998; 
Kale and Arditi, 1998; Stead and Smallman, 1999; Chan et al, 2005; Byabashaija, 
2007; Perry, 2001; Harada, and Kageyama, 2011). There is also a misunderstood 
meaning of management and leadership in the construction industry (CIOB, 2007; 
Ng, 2011; Ricketts, 2009, Kotter, 1990).  
 
Leadership vs. Management 
So, at the stage of turn-around, which is more needed, Management or Leadership? 
According to Kotter (1990), leadership is about coping with change (in this case a 
transition). It focuses on innovation; on the big picture; on strategies that take 
calculated risks; and on people’s values (Warner, 2009). One of the greatest 
arguments on the distinction between leadership and management could be solely 
embedded within the fabric of this statement by John Kotter – “you can’t manage 
people into battle; they need, deserve, and want to be led”(=mc, 2012). That is the 
main function of a leader, to bring change, to use his “big picture” thinking and make 
that which seems impossible possible, to change the fate of a failing company into a 
profitable one, to transform a good company into a great one (Collins 2001). Kotter’s 
concern was for the changing organisation, the business/work environment and how 
this change can be achieved successfully. 
 
An attempt by Kotter to resolve the common question of when leadership or 
management should be used and to what degree resulted in a chart representing the 
relationship between “Change needed” and “Complexity of Operation”.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Relationship between “Change needed” and “Complexity of Operation (Source: Kotter, 
1990; cited in =MC, 2012) 
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Ng (2009) also concludes that company heads must possess both leadership and 
managerial qualities in today’s organisation (top right quadrant). This statement is re-
affirmed for this research as the situation of business failure is one that is very 
complex and requires a high amount of change. According to Goleman 2000, and 
Panthi et al., (2008), managers must be able to navigate between the leadership styles 
with respect to the situation they find themselves. Managers must not be tempted to 
adopt a single style and personalise it but must wear the right leadership hat consistent 
with the problem at hand.  
 
Based on the literature gathered, this research has come to the conclusion that 
“Leadership” is the focal point and the necessary ingredient for a successful turn-
around (see Figure 7).  However, the company head must be able to read the situation 
and know when to switch hats; management or leadership.  
 
 
 
Figure 7: Conceptual framework 
 
Image 
The strategic re-structuring of the company image must be from the inside-out. From 
the vision statement, employee confidence; how do employees see the company?; 
company logo, company processes; state of the art design and technology, company 
atmosphere, company interior design. The power of ‘word of mouth’ must never be 
underestimated, especially coming from an insider. As the old wise saying goes 
“looking good is good business” (Anon, 2012). However, it is important that 
management is not obsessed with the image of its company and ignore what is 
important as in the case of ROK. Confidence can only take you so far without having 
strengthening the core of the business.  
Expected contribution to knowledge 
This research is expected to bridge the gap between theory and practice, to identify, 
understand, and suggest solutions to issues executives and managers face at the point 
of company distress. Issues such as how to drive revenue and profits, optimise cash 
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flow at the same time provide quality products and services, and build effective 
management teams. With a recovery model available, companies know how to be 
better immune to determinants of failure. It is hoped that this research will aid 
managers of companies facing bankruptcy, narrow their focus on the likely 
determinants of their company problems. To easily and quickly identify the problem, 
return to the board, address the problem and turn-around performance towards 
success. Also, it is hoped that with a clearer understanding of the causes of business 
failure, some unsound businesses will not be initiated and some failing businesses can 
be rescued. 
. 
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